Collusion in Algorithmic Pricing

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Outline

- Pricing game under duopoly
- Reinforcement learning and Q-learning
- Empirical results
- Theoretical results

References:

Calvano, Calzolari, Denicolo, Pastorello. Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion. 2020. Bertrand, Duque, Calvano, Gidel. Q-Learnings Can Provably Collude in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. 2023.

Pricing Game

Duopoly

- Two companies dominate the market
- They sell the same or highly substitutable products



Bertrand Duopoly

- Each company determines the price the product: p_1 , p_2
- The marginal cost is the same: $c_1 = c_2 = c$
- The lower priced company wins all demand; each gets half demand if prices are the same

Price relation \ demand	q_1	q_2
$p_1 < p_2$	$D(p_{1}, p_{2})$	0
$p_1 > p_2$	0	$D(p_{1}, p_{2})$
$p_{1} = p_{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}D(p_1,p_2)$	$\frac{1}{2}D(p_1,p_2)$

• Companies *i*'s profit: $R_i = (p_i - c)q_i$

Bertrand Duopoly

- $p_1 = p_2 = c$ is the unique **Nash equilibrium** (NE), called "Bertrand NE"
 - $p_1 = p_2 > c \Rightarrow$ both of them want to slightly decrease the price
 - $p_1, p_2 \ge c$ and $p_1 \ne p_2 \implies$ the lower priced one wants to slightly increase the price
 - $p_1 < c \text{ or } p_2 < c \Rightarrow$ the lower priced one wants set price = c
- There is no profit at NE!
- **Collusion:** $p_1 = p_2 > c$
 - Both companies get positive profit
 - But this is not stable...? (everyone wants to deviate)

Prisoner's Dilemma

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	-1,-1	-10,0
Defect	0,-10	-6,-6

Prisoner's Dilemma

	High	Low
High	5,5	0,6
Low	6,0	3,3

Pricing game

General form:

	С	D
С	X,X	Z,W
D	W,Z	y,y

w > x > y > zUnique NE: (D,D)

One-Shot Game vs. Repeated Game

- One-shot game: play the game once
- Repeated game: play the game repeatedly

In repeated games, the players can make decisions based on the history. This enlarges the policy space, and new NEs become possible.

For example, if both players use the policy:

"Start from **always cooperate**. Switch to **always defect** if the other player ever plays defect." (the "grim-trigger" policy)

Then they are in a NE.

Of course, if both players "always defect," they are also in a NE (but a different one).

Repeated Game (slightly more formalization)

- Assume **perfect information:** every player knows the actions taken by the other players in all previous rounds
- State: the information the player can base their decision on.
 - Full state: At round *t*, the state is

 $(a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{t-1}) \in \mathcal{A}^{t-1}$ where $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{A}_1 \times \mathcal{A}_2 \times \dots \times \mathcal{A}_N$

• Memory-limited state (memory size = k): At round t, the state is

$$(a_{t-k}, a_{t-k+1}, \ldots, a_{t-1}) \in \mathcal{A}^k$$

• **Policy:** a mapping from state to action (or distribution over actions)

$$\mathcal{A}^k \to \mathcal{A}_i \qquad (\text{or } \mathcal{A}^k \to \Delta(\mathcal{A}_i))$$

Repeated Game (slightly more formalization)

Repeated prisoner's dilemma with memory size k = 1

State space = {CC, DD, CD, DC}

My action in theOpponent's action inprevious roundthe previous round

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Always-defect policy:

\pi(CC) = D

\pi(DD) = D

\pi(CD) = D

\pi(DC) = D
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Grim-trigger policy:
$\pi(CC) = C$
$\pi(DD) = D$ $\pi(CD) = D$
$\pi(DC) = D$

Summary for the paper today

- If both players run **Q-learning** (introduced later) individually in a **pricing game**, then they converge to prices higher than the Bertrand Nash price.
- Since Q-learning is an optimization algorithm, the higher prices could be due to
 - Collusion, or
 - Failure of optimization
- The paper confirms that it is due to collusion
 - The learned policies are robust under forced deviation
 - The learned policies have the punishment mechanism

Implications (negative side)

• The antitrust laws (https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-laws-and-you)

The Clayton Act

This law aims to promote fair competition and prevent unfair business practices that could harm consumers. It prohibits certain actions that might restrict competition, like tying agreements, predatory pricing, and mergers that could lessen competition.

An illegal **merger** occurs when two companies join together in a way that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in a relevant market. This reduction in competition can harm consumers by potentially leading to higher prices or fewer choices for products or services. It can also harm workers by potentially leading to lower wages or fewer choices for employment.

An illegal **tying agreement** happens when a company forces customers to buy one product (the tying product) in order to purchase another product (the tied product). The two products are bundled or "tied" together, which gives the tying agreement its name. This practice restricts a customer's choice and can limit competition. In a fair marketplace, business compete on price and on how good their products are life an illegal tying arrangement is in place, a seller can use its strong market power on a popular.

The collusion by Q-learners are legal, because the collusion is not based on explicit agreement. But it still harms the consumer.

Implications (positive side)

 For example, for multi-agent systems, this indicates a simple and decentralized algorithm that achieves high social welfare or global optimal strategy.





- Game theory focuses a lot on characterizing the (Nash) equilibrium
- "If everyone uses the equilibrium policy, then everyone doesn't want to deviate"
- However, it is sometimes unclear how the players **reach** such steady state.

Example. Gradient descent /ascent in two-player zero-sum games leads to *divergence* from the NE.

 $x_{t+1} = x_t + \eta \nabla_x f(x_t, y_t)$ $y_{t+1} = y_t - \eta \nabla_y f(x_t, y_t)$



- There are games with multiple NEs
 - Different initialization and policy-update algorithms converge to different NEs
 - For example, repeated pricing game.
- Usually, games with **dominant strategies** lead to simpler dynamics
 - Every player's best strategy does not depend on the others' strategies
 - For example, repeated second-price auction, repeated selfish routing.

I'm stacking based on where you place the blocks.



l'm moving the blocks based on how you stack!

Reinforcement Learning and Q-Learning

Reinforcement Learning (RL)

• A framework originally developed for a single player to find optimal policy in a **static** environment.



- State: stacking 4 most recent frames (sufficient for us to make decisions, probably)
- Action: left / right
- **Reward:** the reward we get in the game

RL: by playing the game repeatedly, find a good mapping from state to action (i.e., a good policy) that maximizes total reward.

Reinforcement Learning (RL)



• State:

- Position of the robot
- Signals from the sensor (e.g., can detect the objects in 4 neighboring squares)
- Action: E / W / N / S
- Reward:
 - Fire: -30
 - Diamond: +20
 - Every step before reaching EXIT: -2

Q-Learning

- Idea: dynamic programming
- Try to find a value function *Q* satisfying

$$Q(s, a) = R(s, a) + \underbrace{\delta}_{s' \sim P(\cdot|s, a)} \begin{bmatrix} \max Q(s', a') \\ a' \end{bmatrix}$$

Reward function State transition probability

then $\pi(s) = \underset{a}{\operatorname{argmax}} Q(s, a)$ is an optimal policy (i.e., getting highest cumulative reward in the long-run)

• But we don't know R(s, a) and P(s'|s, a) in advance

Q-Learning with ϵ -Greedy Exploration

For
$$t = 1, 2, ...$$

Choose action $a_t = \begin{cases} \operatorname{argmax}_{a} Q(s_t, a) & \text{with probability } 1 - \epsilon \\ a & \text{with probability } \epsilon \end{cases}$
Observe instantaneous reward R_t and next state s_{t+1} .
Update

$$Q(s_t, a_t) \leftarrow (1 - \alpha)Q(s_t, a_t) + \alpha \left(R_t + \delta \max_a Q(s_{t+1}, a)\right)$$

Theory for Q-Learning (Tsitsiklis, 1994)

lf

- 1) state transition probability P(s'|s,a) is fixed over time,
- 2) reward function R(s,a) is fixed over time, and
- 3) every s,a is visited infinitely often,

then Q-learning converges to the fixed point of the Bellman optimality equation (and gives the optimal policy).

However, this theorem does not apply to the pricing game setting

• The reward function R(s, a) and the transition $P(\cdot | s, a)$ depend on the policy of the other player, which changes over time

Empirical Results

Calvano, Calzolari, Denicolo, Pastorello. Artificial Intellifence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion. 2020.

Experiment Setting

Demand assumption:

 a_i : the quality of company *i*'s product

 $p_{i,t}$: company *i*'s price at round *t*

 c_i : marginal cost of company i

 μ : $\mu = 0$ means products are perfectly substitutable

$$q_{i,t} = \frac{\exp\left(\frac{a_i - p_{i,t}}{\mu}\right)}{\sum_{j=1}^2 \exp\left(\frac{a_j - p_{j,t}}{\mu}\right) + \exp\left(\frac{a_0}{\mu}\right)}$$

Profit:

$$R_{i,t} = (p_{i,t} - c_i)q_{i,t}$$

They use parameters: $c_1 = c_2 = 1$, $a_1 = a_2 = 2$, $a_0 = 0$, $\mu = 1/4$

Experiment Setting

- Price discretization: 15 possible prices
- State = (my price at round t-1, my opponent's price at round t-1)

• Q-learning parameters (α, β) :

$$Q_{t+1}(s, a) = (1 - \alpha)Q_t(s, a) + \alpha \left[R_t + \delta \max_{a'} Q_t(s', a') \right]$$
 Learning rate
 $\epsilon_t = e^{-\beta t}$ Exploration rate

Evaluating the Degree of Collusion

$$\Delta = \frac{\bar{R} - R^{\text{Bertrand}}}{R^{\text{Monopoly}} - R^{\text{Bertrand}}}$$

R^{Monopoly}: profit in full cooperation *R*^{Bertrand}: profit in full competition
(i.e., equilibrium profit in one-shot game)



Figure 1. Average Profit Gain Δ for a Grid of Values of α and β

Frequency of Playing Nash



Figure 2. Fraction of Sessions Converging to a Nash Equilibrium, for a Grid of Values of α and β

Whether the policies of the two players best responses to each other

Takeaway:

In many cases, Q-learners do *learn* NE, so the high price is NOT due to failure of optimization.

Recall: There are multiple NEs. Q-learners tend to find NEs with colluded prices.

The effect of Discount Factor δ



Takeaway: Larger discount factor leads to more collusion.

Figure 3. The Average Profit Gain Δ as a Function of the Discount Factor δ in Our Representative Experiment

Deviation and Punishment



FIGURE 4

Some Theoretical Analysis

Bertrand, Duque, Calvano, Gidel. Q-Learnings Can Provably Collude in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. 2023.

Setting

- In Prisoner's dilemma, running Q-learning with
 - Sufficiently large discount factor δ
 - Some conditions on the Q-value initialization
 - Symmetric initialization

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Assumption 7 (Q-values Initialization).
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 \begin{array}{ll} {\rm i}) & Q_{\rm (D,D),D}^{\star,{\rm Defect}} \triangleq \frac{r_{\rm DD}}{1-\gamma} < Q_{\rm (D,D),C}^{t_0} \ , \\ {\rm ii}) & Q_{\rm (C,C),D}^{\star,{\rm Lose-shift}} \triangleq \frac{r_{\rm DD}+\gamma r_{\rm CC}}{1-\gamma^2} < Q_{\rm (C,C),C}^{t_0} \ , \\ {\rm iii}) & Q_{\rm (C,C),C}^{t_0} < \frac{r_{\rm CC}}{1-\gamma} \triangleq Q_{\rm (C,C),C}^{\star,{\rm Pavlov}} \ , \\ {\rm iv}) & and \ for \ all \ s \in \{{\rm C,D}\}^2, \ Q_{s,D}^{t_0} > Q_{s,C}^{t_0} \ . \end{array}
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the policies of the players can adapt from Always-defect to Lose-shift to Pavlov

Lose-shift: Play { C, if players play (D,D) in the previous round D, otherwise

Pavlov: PlayC, if players play (C,C) or (D,D) in the previous round
D, otherwise

Experiments



Summary

- Repeated games have more complex structure than one-shot games
 - One-shot pricing game / prisoner's dilemma \rightarrow unique NE
 - Repeated pricing game / prisoner's dilemma \rightarrow multiple NEs
- The field of learning in games discusses the evolution of the players' policies over time
 - Could converge towards NE
 - Could diverge from NE
 - Heavily depends on initialization and the learning algorithms they use
- In pricing game / prisoner's dilemma, independent Q-learners tend to collude / cooperate