


# **Linear Last-iterate Convergence in Constrained Saddle-point Optimization**

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# Collaborators



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# Background

# Today's topic

Two-player zero-sum game / saddle-point problem:  $\min_x \max_y f(x, y)$

The goal is to find an (approximate) solution of it. (a.k.a. equilibrium)

## Applications:

- Generative Adversarial Networks
- Primal-dual methods (e.g., max flow, MDP, optimal transport)
- Multi-agent (reinforcement) learning problems (e.g., game of Go)

We will focus on a specific class of algorithm “**optimistic mirror descent**”.

# Formalization

$$\min_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \max_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} f(x, y)$$

Define  $\mathcal{Z} \triangleq \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$  and write  $z = (x, y) \in \mathcal{Z}$

## Assumption 1. Convex-concave game

$\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^A, \mathcal{Y} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^B$  are convex sets

$f(z) = f(x, y)$  is convex in  $x$  and concave in  $y$

## Assumption 2. Smoothness

Let  $F(z) = \begin{bmatrix} \nabla_x f(x, y) \\ -\nabla_y f(x, y) \end{bmatrix}$  Assume  $\|F(z) - F(z')\| \leq L\|z - z'\|$

# A simple first-order method

## Gradient Descent (GD)

$$x_{t+1} = \Pi_{\mathcal{X}} [x_t - \eta \nabla_x f(x_t, y_t)]$$


$$y_{t+1} = \Pi_{\mathcal{Y}} [y_t + \eta \nabla_y f(x_t, y_t)]$$

which can be simplified as


$$z_{t+1} = \Pi_{\mathcal{Z}} [z_t - \eta F(z_t)]$$

# The dynamics of GD

$$f(x, y) = x^\top \begin{bmatrix} 1 & -1 \\ -1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} y$$




Update direction



Trajectory ( $\eta = 0.1$ )

# Proximal-Point Method (Rockafellar'76)


$$z_{t+1} = \Pi_{\mathcal{Z}} [z_t - \eta F(z_{t+1})]$$




$$(x_{t+1}, y_{t+1}) = \operatorname{argmin}_{x \in \mathcal{X}, y \in \mathcal{Y}} \left\{ f(x, y) + \frac{1}{2\eta} \|x - x_t\|^2 - \frac{1}{2\eta} \|y - y_t\|^2 \right\}$$



# The dynamics of Proximal-Point Method



Update direction




Trajectory ( $\eta = 0.1$ )

# Extra Gradient Descent (EG) (Tseng'95)

$$z'_{t+1} = \Pi_{\mathcal{Z}} [z_t - \eta F(z_t)] \quad \text{Prediction Step}$$


$$z_{t+1} = \Pi_{\mathcal{Z}} [z_t - \eta F(z'_{t+1})] \quad \text{Real Update}$$



# Optimistic Gradient Descent (OGD) (Popov'80)

$$z'_{t+1} = \Pi_{\mathcal{Z}} [z_t - \eta F(z'_t)] \quad \text{Prediction Step}$$

$$z_{t+1} = \Pi_{\mathcal{Z}} [z_t - \eta F(z'_{t+1})] \quad \text{Real Update}$$



# Comparing EG and OGD

EG

$$\begin{aligned} z'_{t+1} &= \Pi_{\mathcal{Z}} [z_t - \eta F(z_t)] \\ z_{t+1} &= \Pi_{\mathcal{Z}} [z_t - \eta F(z'_{t+1})] \end{aligned}$$

OGD

$$\begin{aligned} z'_{t+1} &= \Pi_{\mathcal{Z}} [z_t - \eta F(z'_t)] \\ z_{t+1} &= \Pi_{\mathcal{Z}} [z_t - \eta F(z'_{t+1})] \end{aligned}$$

Algorithm	Converge under self-play?	No regret against adversary?
GD		✓
EG	✓	
OGD	✓	✓

Single gradient call per update  
Run alone, it is a no-regret algorithm

# Optimistic Multiplicative Weight Update

$$f(x, y) = x^\top G y$$

$$x'_{t+1,i} \propto x_{t,i} e^{-\eta(Gy'_t)_i} \quad \text{Prediction Step}$$

$$x_{t+1,i} \propto x_{t,i} e^{-\eta(Gy'_{t+1})_i} \quad \text{Real Update}$$

$$y'_{t+1,i} \propto y_{t,i} e^{\eta(G^\top x'_t)_i} \quad \text{Prediction Step}$$

$$y_{t+1,i} \propto y_{t,i} e^{\eta(G^\top x'_{t+1})_i} \quad \text{Real Update}$$

# Related works and contributions (1/2)

Results for OGD in smooth convex-concave games

paper	function	iterate	constrained setting	rate
Popov'80		last	✓	asymptotic
Rakhlin & Sridharan'13		average	✓	$\Theta(1/t)$
Gidel et al'19	strongly convex/concave	last	✓	$e^{-\lambda t}$
Liang & Stokes'19	bilinear	last		$e^{-\lambda t}$
<b>Ours</b>	SP-MS ( $\beta$ )	last	✓	$(\lambda t)^{-\frac{1}{\beta}}, e^{-\lambda t}$
<b>Ours</b> (special case)	bilinear in polytope	last	✓	$e^{-\lambda t}$
Golowich et al.'20	2 <sup>nd</sup> -order smoothness	last		$\Theta(1/\sqrt{t})$

We also show that in some **non-polytope bilinear** games (parabolic boundary), the rate can be  $\Omega(1/t^2)$

# Related works and contributions (2/2)

Results for Optimistic Multiplicative Weight in bilinear games on simplexes

paper	Iterate	step size	assumption	rate
Rakhlin & Sridharan'13	average	constant	-	$1/t$
Daskalakis & Panageas'19	last	$< (AB)^{-1/z_i^*}$	unique equilibrium	asymptotic
<b>Ours</b>	last	constant	unique equilibrium	$e^{-\lambda t}$
<b>Ours</b>	last	constant	-	asymptotic

# **Convergence Analysis**



# Convergence Analysis (1/3)

Let's focus on the unconstrained setting

$$\begin{aligned} z'_{t+1} &= z_t - \eta M_{t+1} \\ z_{t+1} &= z_t - \eta F(z'_{t+1}) \end{aligned}$$

$$M_{t+1} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{GD} \\ F(z_{t+1}) & \text{Proximal} \\ F(z_t) & \text{EG} \\ F(z'_t) & \text{OGD} \end{cases}$$

Equilibrium:  $z_\star = (x_\star, y_\star) \quad f(x_\star, y) \leq f(x_\star, y_\star) \leq f(x, y_\star)$

$$\begin{aligned} \|z_t - z_\star\|^2 &= \|z_{t+1} - z_\star + \eta F(z'_{t+1})\|^2 \\ &= \|z_{t+1} - z_\star\|^2 + 2\eta(z_{t+1} - z_\star) \cdot F(z'_{t+1}) + \eta^2 \|F(z'_{t+1})\|^2 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} z'_{t+1} &= z_t - \eta M_{t+1} \\ z_{t+1} &= z_t - \eta F(z'_{t+1}) \end{aligned}$$

$$M_{t+1} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{GD} \\ F(z_{t+1}) & \text{Proximal} \\ F(z_t) & \text{EG} \\ F(z'_t) & \text{OGD} \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\forall z \in \mathcal{Z}, \\ &(z - z_*) \cdot F(z) \\ &= (x - x_*) \cdot \nabla f_x(x, y) - (y - y_*) \cdot \nabla f_y(x, y) \\ &\geq f(x, y) - f(x_*, y) - f(x, y) + f(x, y_*) \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\|z_{t+1} - z_*\|^2 \leq \|z_t - z_*\|^2 - \underbrace{2\eta(z_{t+1} - z_*) \cdot F(z'_{t+1}) - \eta^2 \|F(z'_{t+1})\|^2}_{\text{red bracket}}$$

Proximal

$$-2\eta(z_{t+1} - z_*) \cdot F(z_{t+1}) - \eta^2 \|F(z'_{t+1})\|^2 \leq 0 \quad \text{😊}$$

Other cases

$$\begin{aligned} &-2\eta(z_{t+1} - z_*) \cdot F(z'_{t+1}) - \eta^2 \|F(z'_{t+1})\|^2 \\ &= \underbrace{-2\eta(z'_{t+1} - z_*) \cdot F(z'_{t+1})}_{\text{red box}} + 2\eta \underbrace{(z'_{t+1} - z_{t+1})}_{\text{blue box}} \cdot F(z'_{t+1}) - \eta^2 \|F(z'_{t+1})\|^2 \\ &\leq 0 \qquad \qquad \qquad = \eta(F(z'_{t+1}) - M_{t+1}) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\leq 2\eta^2 (F(z'_{t+1}) - M_{t+1}) \cdot F(z'_{t+1}) - \eta^2 \|F(z'_{t+1})\|^2 \\ &= \eta^2 \|F(z'_{t+1}) - M_{t+1}\|^2 - \eta^2 \|M_{t+1}\|^2 \end{aligned}$$

For GD, this  $\geq 0$



$$\|z_{t+1} - z_\star\|^2 \leq \|z_t - z_\star\|^2 + \eta^2 \left( \|F(z'_{t+1}) - M_{t+1}\|^2 - \|M_{t+1}\|^2 \right)$$

**EG**

$$\begin{aligned} z'_{t+1} &= z_t - \eta F(z_t) \\ z_{t+1} &= z_t - \eta F(z'_{t+1}) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \|F(z'_{t+1}) - M_{t+1}\|^2 - \|M_{t+1}\|^2 \\ &= \|F(z'_{t+1}) - F(z_t)\|^2 - \|F(z_t)\|^2 \\ &\leq L^2 \|z'_{t+1} - z_t\|^2 - \|F(z_t)\|^2 \\ &\leq \eta^2 L^2 \|F(z_t)\|^2 - \|F(z_t)\|^2 \\ &\leq -\frac{1}{2} \|F(z_t)\|^2 \\ &\quad \eta \leq \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}L} \end{aligned}$$

**OGD**


$$\begin{aligned} z'_{t+1} &= z_t - \eta F(z'_t) \\ z_{t+1} &= z_t - \eta F(z'_{t+1}) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \|F(z'_{t+1}) - M_{t+1}\|^2 - \|M_{t+1}\|^2 \\ &= \|F(z'_{t+1}) - F(z'_t)\|^2 - \|F(z'_t)\|^2 \\ &\leq L^2 \|z'_{t+1} - z'_t\|^2 - \|F(z'_t)\|^2 \\ &\leq \eta^2 L^2 \|2F(z'_t) - F(z'_{t-1})\|^2 - \|F(z'_t)\|^2 \\ &\leq 8\eta^2 L^2 \|F(z'_t)\|^2 + 2\eta^2 L^2 \|F(z'_{t-1})\|^2 - \|F(z'_t)\|^2 \\ &\leq -\frac{1}{2} \|F(z'_t)\|^2 + \frac{1}{8} \|F(z'_{t-1})\|^2 \\ &\quad \eta \leq \frac{1}{4L} \end{aligned}$$

# Convergence Analysis

EG  $\|z_{t+1} - z_\star\|^2 \leq \|z_t - z_\star\|^2 - \frac{1}{2}\eta^2 \|F(z_t)\|^2$

OGD  $\|z_{t+1} - z_\star\|^2 \leq \|z_t - z_\star\|^2 - \frac{1}{2}\eta^2 \|F(z'_t)\|^2 + \frac{1}{8}\eta^2 \|F(z'_{t-1})\|^2$

  $\underbrace{\|z_{t+1} - z_\star\|^2 + \frac{1}{8}\eta^2 \|F(z'_t)\|^2}_{\Theta_{t+1}} \leq \underbrace{\|z_t - z_\star\|^2 + \frac{1}{8}\eta^2 \|F(z'_{t-1})\|^2}_{\Theta_t} - \frac{3}{8}\eta^2 \|F(z'_t)\|^2$

# Formal Result for the Constrained Setting

Define  $\Theta_t = \|z_t - \Pi_{\mathcal{Z}_*}(z_t)\|^2 + \frac{1}{16} \|z_t - z'_t\|^2$

$$\Theta_{t+1} \leq \Theta_t - c\Theta_t \Rightarrow \Theta_t = \mathcal{O}(e^{-ct})$$

$$\Theta_{t+1} \leq \Theta_t - c\Theta_t^2 \Rightarrow \Theta_t = \mathcal{O}(1/t)$$

$$\Theta_{t+1} \leq \Theta_t - c\Theta_t^3 \Rightarrow \Theta_t = \mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{t})$$

Then OGD with  $\eta \leq \frac{1}{8L}$  guarantees

$$\Theta_{t+1} \leq \Theta_t - \underbrace{\frac{1}{2} \eta^2 \max_{z' \in \mathcal{Z}} \frac{[(z_{t+1} - z')^\top F(z_{t+1})]_+^2}{\|z_{t+1} - z'\|^2}}_{\text{Relate this part to } \Theta_t \text{ (or } \Theta_{t+1} \text{ )}}$$

Convergence rate?

Relate this part to  $\Theta_t$  (or  $\Theta_{t+1}$ )

# Convergence Rate

Saddle-point Metric-subregularity (**SP-MS**) Condition:

$$\exists C > 0, \beta \geq 0 \quad \forall z \in \mathcal{Z} \quad \max_{z' \in \mathcal{Z}} \frac{(z - z')^\top F(z)}{\|z - z'\|} \geq C \|z - \Pi_{\mathcal{Z}_*}(z)\|^{1+\beta}$$

$$\beta = 0: \quad \Theta_{t+1} \leq e^{-\lambda t}$$

bilinear games in polytopes  
strongly-convex-strongly-concave games

$$\beta > 0: \quad \Theta_{t+1} \leq (\lambda t)^{-1/\beta}$$

# Result for Optimistic Multiplicative Weight Update

Define  $\Theta_t = \text{KL}(z_\star, z_t) + \frac{1}{16} \text{KL}(z'_t, z_t)$

Then OMWU with  $\eta \leq \frac{1}{8L}$  guarantees

$$\Theta_{t+1} \leq \Theta_t - \underbrace{\frac{15}{16} (\text{KL}(z_{t+1}, z'_{t+1}) + \text{KL}(z'_{t+1}, z_t))}_{\zeta_t}$$

**Phase 1:**  $\zeta_t \geq \eta^2 C_1 \text{KL}(z_\star, z_{t+1})^2 \Rightarrow \Theta_t \leq 1/(\lambda_1 t)$


**Phase 2** (when  $\|z_t - z_\star\| \leq \eta\xi$ ):  $\zeta_t \geq \eta^2 C_2 \text{KL}(z_\star, z_{t+1}) \Rightarrow \Theta_t \leq e^{-\lambda_2 t}$

# **Extension to Markov Games**

Last-iterate Convergence of Decentralized Optimistic Gradient  
Descent/Ascent in Infinite-horizon Competitive Markov Games



# Markov Games



State:  $s$

Player 1's action  $a$ , Player 2's action  $b$

Loss/payoff function:  $\sigma(s, a, b)$

Transition function:  $s' \sim p(\cdot | s, a, b)$

# Markov Games

Existing provably convergent algorithms usually belong to one of the following:

- Centralized algorithm
- Two-timescale algorithm (Golowich et al.'20)
- Algorithm that only handles multi-stage games (Perolat et al.'18)

Is there an algorithm in general Markov games that

- Converges to Nash equilibria when both players use the same algorithm
- Converges to the best response when the other player converges to a fixed policy

A rational and convergent algorithm (Bowling & Veloso'01)

# Markov Games

We propose an actor-critic algorithm where

**The policy learner (actor)** runs OGD on each state

**The value learner (critic)** slows down the variation of the game matrix

critic

$$Q_t(s, a, b) \triangleq \sigma(s, a, b) + \gamma \mathbb{E}_{s' \sim p(\cdot | s, a, b)} [V_{t-1}(s')]$$

$$V_t(s) = (1 - \alpha_t) V_{t-1}(s) + \alpha_t \sum_{a, b} x'_t(a|s) y'_t(b|s) Q_t(s, a, b)$$

actor

$$x'_{t+1}(\cdot | s) = \Pi_{\Delta_A} \left( x_t(\cdot | s) - \eta \sum_{b \in B} Q_t(s, \cdot, b) y'_t(b|s) \right)$$

$$x_{t+1}(\cdot | s) = \Pi_{\Delta_A} \left( x_t(\cdot | s) - \eta \sum_{b \in B} Q_{t+1}(s, \cdot, b) y'_{t+1}(b|s) \right)$$

# Theorem for Markov Games

$$\sqrt{\frac{1}{S} \sum_s \|z_t(\cdot|s) - \Pi_{z^*(\cdot|s)}(z_t(\cdot|s))\|^2} = \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{S}{\eta^2 C^2 (1 - \gamma)^2} \sqrt{\frac{1}{t}}\right)$$